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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Unfair Competition-Secondary Meaning of Trade Names
in Cases of Dissimilar Products
Plaintiff is the publisher of "Seventeen," a magazine of fashions
and other interests for girls of high school age. It began publication
in August 1944 and had the name "Seventeen" registered in the patent
office as a tradename for "a monthly magazine devoted to the interests
of girls." Defendants are manufacturers of dresses for "teen-age"
girls, named and labeled "Seventeen for the Junior Teens." They
began to show samples to the trade in November 1944 but did not
make deliveries until May 1945. Plaintiff, in March 1945, brought an
action for infringement and unfair competition grounded on defend-
ant's use of the word "Seventeen" in their tradename and label. The
evidence showed that plaintiff's magazine had had a phenomenal suc-
cess from the time of its first publication; that in addition to the pub-
lication of the magazine the plaintiff also conducts a sales promotion
service designed to promote the sale of dresses which have been ad-
vertised in its magazine; that this service consists of expert advice
as to styles and salesmanship, as well as reprints, counter cards and
"blow-ups" of its advertisements for use in store displays; and that
the plaintiff also sells hang-tags for garments on sales racks, featuring
the words "You saw it in Seventeen." The evidence further showed
that the word "Seventeen," as used by the defendants in their label,
was given prominence over the words "for the Junior Teens"; and that
the defendants furnished dealers with hang-tags, such as the plaintiff
did, in which the word "Seventeen" was emphasized. The trial court
found that the defendants had deliberately chosen the word "Seven-
teen" with a knowledge of the good reputation that the plaintiff's
magazine had acquired and with the intention of taking unfair ad-
vantage of its reputation and good will; that persons in the apparel
business had been confused by the defendant's tradename into think-
ing that there was some relation or connection between their dresses
and the plaintiff's magazine; and that the confusion was likely to
continue.' From a judgment granting injunctive relief the defendants
appealed. Held: Although there was no technical infringement of
the plaintiff's statutory registration, since the defendant's merchandise
was not "of substantially the same descriptive properties" as that regis-
tered by the plaintiff, that the use of the name of the magazine in a
service for commercially blessing and obliquely branding the mer-
chandise of others endowed the tradename "Seventeen" with a sec-
ondary meaning which is entitled to protection.2
The development of the law of unfair competition is of cqmpara-
'Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Hanson, 65 F. Supp. 952 (E. D. Mo. 1946).
-Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Hanson, 163 F. 2d 74 (C. C. A. 8th 1947).
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tively recent origin.3 A trader's protection in the use of his trade-
name is but a part of the broader field of unfair competition, 4 the
general purpose of which is to prevent one person from passing off
his goods or services as the goods or services of another. 5 The early
cases were based solely upon the fraudulent use of technical tradenames
or marks and thus .protection was narrowly confined by the defense that
the names in question did not comply with the common law require-
ments.6 To be valid under the rules of the common law a technical
tradename must be fanciful and arbitrary, and not merely generic
or descriptive of the goods or their quality;7 nor may it be merely
geographical. 8 It cannot be obtained in the form, appearance, or finish
of one's.goods, nor in the mere size or shape or mode of construction
of a container. 9 It cannot be a personal name;1O and whatever the
name it must be affixed to the goods in connection with which it is
used.1 Obviously, with the growth of commerce and the attendant
growth in advertising and other methods of creating good will there
is found the use of numerous names not worthy of protection as a
technical tradename because not complying with some of the require-
ments set out above. It was through the efforts of the courts to
avoid these hardships in protecting reputation and to halt dishonesty
in the trade, even in the absence of an infringement of a technical
tradename, that the doctrine of "secondary meaning" came into being.'2
The doctrine may be generally stated as meaning that words or sym-
bols used in connection with one's goods, services, or business, or the
physical attributes of one's goods, which for some reason or other, are
not capable of exclusive appropriation as a technical tradename, may
nevertheless be protected against simulation when they have acquired
a secondary meaning,-3 differing from their primary meaning, that
is, when they have become associated in the mind of the public as
'As late as 1742, Lord Hardwicke in denying relief stated that he "knew of
no instance of restraining one trader from making use of the same mark with
another." Blanchard v. Hill, 2 Atk. 484 (1742), quoted in Note, 38 Hv. L.
REv. 370 (1924).
' Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403 (1916).
' fJnited Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248 U. S. 90 (1918).
'Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Alien and Wheeler Co., 208 Fed. 513 (C.C.A.
7th 1913); aff'd. 240 U. S. 403 (1916).
Elgin National Watch Co. v. Ill. Watch Case Co., 179 U. S. 665 (1901).
Also see 26 R.C.L. 847.
'La Republic Francaise v. Saratoga Vichy Springs Co., 107 Fed. 459, 461
(C.C.A. 2d 1901).
'Up-John Co. v. Win. S. Merrell Chemical Co., 269 Fed. 209 (C.C.A. 6th
1920), cert. denied, 257 U. S. 638 (1921).
"Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co., 233 U. S. 461 (1914).
'.XDiederich v. Schneider Wholesale Wine Co., 195 Fed. 35 (C.C.A. 8th
191?)?. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 Fed. 369 (C.C.A. 6th 1912).
as bid.
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identifying the source or origin of goods, rather than the goods
themselves.14
The test to be applied is whether the name has become broadly
known to the public as denoting a product of certain origin.Y5 It is
essential that the secondary meaning claimed be indicative of origin
and not merely descriptive of the process of manufacture,' 0 or of the
functional features17 of the goods or services.' 8 The plaintiff has
the burden of showing that the disputed name has acquired a secondary
meaning,'9 and that the defendant has unfairly used it, or a simulation
thereof, to the prejudice of the plaintiff's interests. 20
Since a trader's right grows out of the use of the tradename he
has chosen and not its mere adoption,21 to state a cause of action
the plaintiff must show his exclusive use and the establishrient of a
secondary meaning prior to the time of the defendant's use.2 2 In
establishing the fact of identity of origin in the public consciousness
the plaintiff may present testimony of members of the purchasing pub-
lic,2 3 or of retailers or salesmen.24 But the view of the general pur-
chasing public is controlling, 25 inasmuch as the test, as pointed out
above,26 is the reaction of the general public. Evidence of expendi-
tures in advertising a name used in connection with a trader's goods,
services, or business, while not conclusive, is an important factor in
determining the existence of a secondary meaning.27 The same is
true of showing a large volume of sales.28 Not only must the plaintiff
"Armstrong Paint and Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U. S.
315 (1938).
" .Barton v. Rex-Oil Co., 2 F. 2d 402 (C.C.A. 3d 1924). See Notes, 40 A.L.R.
424 (1924); 150 A.L.R. 1079 (1943).
'- Rubber and C. Harness Trimming Co. v. F. W. Devoe and C. T. Reynolds
Co., 233 Fed. 150 (N. J. 1916).
,"'Functional features" in unfair competition cases means those which, in
an engineering sense, are necessary to the construction of an article. Lektro-
Shave Corp. v. General Shaver Corp., 92 F. 2d 435 (C.C.A. 2d 1937).
18 Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 Fed. 960 (C.C.A. 2d
1918). Also see Note, 150 A.L.R. 1079 (1943).
"
9 Kellogg Toasted Corn Flake Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 235 Fed. 657 (C.C.A.
6th 1916).
"McGraw-Hill Pub. Co. v. American Aviation Associates, 117 F. 2d 293r
296 (App. D. C. 1940).
"Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403 (1916).
"Up-John Co. v. Wm. S. Merrell Chemical Co., 269 Fed. 209 (C.C.A. 6th
1920), cert. denied, 257 U. S. 638 (1921). Also see Sterling Products Corp. v.
Sterling Products, 45 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
"Steem-Electric Corp. v. Herzfeld-Phillipson Co., 118 F. 2d 122 (C.C.A.
7th 1940).
"Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 Fed. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
" Steem-Electric Corp. v. Herzfeld-Phillipson Co., 118 F. 2d 122 (C.C.A.
7th 1940).
" Barton v. Rex-Oil Co., 2 F. 2d 402 (C.C.A. 3d 1924). See Notes, 40
A.L.R. 424 (1924); 150 A.L.R. 1079 (1943).
" Premier-Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754 (Conn.
1935).
8 Up-John Co. v. Win. S. Merrell Chemical Co., 269 Fed. 209 (C.C.A. 6th
1920), cert. denied, 257 U. S. 638 (1921).
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show the establishment of identity of origin2 9 but he must also show
the resulting confusion in the minds of dealers and the purchasing
public caused by the defendant's simulation of the plaintiff's trade-
name.3 0 This too may be proved by testimony of members of the
purchasing public3 ' and by that of dealers.32 Some courts have held
that as a condition to granting relief a fraudulent intent must be
proved.83 But, since the injury to the plaintiff is the same regardless
of intent, the better view is that intent is immaterial.3 4
The early secondary meaning cases expressed the strict view of
unfair competition. Not only did the parties have to be competing
in the same territory, but they had to sell the same article.35 This may
be explained by the fact that the earlier cases demanding relief under
the theory of unfair competition were all simple cases of one trader
passing off his good as those of a rival.30 Since all of these early de-
cisions turned solely on the "passing off" by the defendant, the courts
later on could find but little authority for enjoining the acts of a
defendant who was not, strictly speaking, a competitor of the plain-
tiff.87 However the history of tradename litigation shows that the
use of similar names in non-competing fields has become the normal
rather than the exceptional case of infringement.38 In recognition of
this development the courts began to extend their protection to cases
involving dissimilar, non-competing products if it could be shown that
they were "related."3 9 Under the "relation" doctrine protection was
extended in cases involving pancake flour and syrup,40 baking powder
and baking soda,41 washing powder and sweeping powder,42 men's
suits and men's hats,43 cooking pans and wash boilers,44 beer and
"Barton v. Rex-Oil Co., 2 F. 2d 402 (C.C.A. 3d 1924); See Notes, 40 A.L.R.
424 (1924); 150 A.L.R. 1079 (1943).
"Zangerle & P. Co. v. Venice Furniture Novelty Mfg. Co., 133 F. 2d 266
(C.C.A. 7th 1934).
"1Steem-Electric Corp. v. -erzfeld-Phillipson Co., 118 F. 2d 122 (C.C.A.
7th 1940).
1" Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 Fed. 505 (S.D. N.Y. 1921).
"United Lace and Braid Mfg. Co. v. Barthels Mfg. Co., 221 Fed. 456 (E.D.
N.Y. 1915).
"American Products Co. v. American Products Co., 42 F. 2d 488 (E.D.
Mich. 1930); Trappey v. McIlhenny Co., 281 Fed. 23 (C.C.A. 5th 1922), cert.
denied, 260 U. S. 733 (1922), modified, 12 F. 2d 19 (C.C.A. 5th 1926), cert.
denied, 273 U. S. 699 (1926).
" Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 Fed. 510(C.C.A. 7th 1912).
"NIms, UNFAIR COmPFTiTIoN 4 (2d ed. 1919).
"' See Note, 38 HARv. L. Rav. 370 (1924) and authorities there cited.
"8 Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HAav. L. Rs-v.
813, 825 (1927).
" Aunt Jemima Mills v. Rigney Co., 247 Fed. 407 (C.C.A. 2d 1917).
40 Ibid.
"'Layton Pure Food Co. v. Church and Dwight Co., 182 Fed. 35 (C.C.A.
8th 1910).
'Van Zile v. Norub Mfg. Co., 228 Fed. 829 (E.D.N.Y. 1916).
"Rosenberg Bros. v. Elliot, 7 F. 2d 962 (C.C.A. 3d 1925).
"Aluminum Cooking Utensil Co. v. Sargoy Bros. and Co., 276 Fed. 447(E.D.N.Y. 1921).
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-malt syrup,4 5 automobiles and tires,4 6 cut tobacco and cigarettes,4 7
toilet soap and shaving soap,4 8 pianos and phonographs,4 9 toilet brushes
and toothbrushes, 50 flour and bread, 5 ' automobiles and radio tubes.5 2
The cases cited established beyond controversy that the products
need not be the same in order for relief to be granted, and that there
need be neither confusion in the narrow sense that one article would
be mistaken for the other, nor competition in the sense that the con-
sumer's need for the one would be fulfilled by his purchase of the
other.53 In applying the relationship doctrine to grant relief where
the products were dissimilar the courts were but a step away from
granting relief even in the absence of a relationship if there Was ac-
tually unfair competition. The fact that at this stage the tendency
of the courts was to emphasize the word "unfair" rather than "com-
petition"5 4 made that step an easy one to take. Today, relief will be
granted if it be shown that the defendant's use of the plaintiff's trade-
name creates in the public mind the impression of some "connection"
existing between the parties,5 5 and/or simply that there is a likelihood
that the public will be confused as to the idetity of the maker of the
defendant's product. 56 The result is certainly consistent with the test
to determine secondary meaning, as set out above, 5 7 as well as with the
"'Anheuser Busch v. Budweiser Malt Products Corp., 287 Fed. 243 (S.D.
N.Y. 1921).
" Willys-Overland Co. v. Akron-Overland Tire Co., 268 Fed. 151 (Del. 1920),
aff'd, 273 Fed. 674 (C.C.A. 3d 1921).
'47 American Tobacco Co. v. Polacsek, 170 Fed. 117 (C.C.S.D.Y. 1909).
' Waltke and Co. v. Schafer and Co., 263 Fed. 650 (App. D. C. 1920).
"Wilcox and White Co. v. Leiser, 276 Fed. 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
"Florence Mfg. Co. v. J. C. Dowd and Co., 178 Fed. 73 (C.C.A. 2d 1910).
" Potter-Wrightington, Inc. v. Ward Baking Co., 288 Fed. 597 (Mass. 1923),
aff'd 298 Fed. 398 (C.C.A. 1st 1924).
"Wall v. Rolls-Royce of America, 4 F. 2d 272 (C.C.A. 2d 1934), Though
the result of this case is certainly the correct one the reasoning of the court has
been subjected to much criticism. See Lukens, The Application of the Principles
of Unfair Competition to Cases of Dissimilar Products, 75 U. oF PA. L. REv.
197, 203 (1927) where it is said, "A layman reading the facts of the Rolls-Royce
case-would instantly say that the defendant's act was unfair. A court comes
to the same conclusion as quickly, but to justify its conclusion must employ
the far-fetched reasoning that automobiles and radio tubes are related because
they both involve the use of electricity, which would lead with equal logic to the
conclusion that submarines and pocket flashlights are related products. It is
much more certain that the use of the name Rolls-Royce for radio tubes is
unfair than that radio tubes and automobiles are related products.
3 Id. at 200.
' Oates, Relief in Equity against Unfair Trade Practices of Non-competi-
tors, 25 ILu. L. REv. 643, 645 (1931).
" Tiffany and Co. v. Tiffany Productions Inc., 147 Misc. 679, 264 N. Y. Supp.
459 (1932), aff'd 237 App. Div. 801 (1932), aff'd 262 N. Y. 482, 188 N.E. 30
(1933).
"Wolff, Non-competing Goods in Trademark Law, 37 CoL. L. REv. 582
(1937).
"'See note 15 supra. Also see Vick Chemical Co. v. Vick Medicine Co.,
8 F. 2d 49 (S.D. Ga. 1925).
At the same time the courts relaxed the strict territorial requirements and
in order to forestall any possibility of injury to the plaintiff began to grant re-
[Vol. 26
NOTES AND COMMENTS
fundamental principle of the law of unfair competition, viz., that a
man's continued enjoyment of his trade reputation and the good will
flowing therefrom should be protected.5 8 Under the modem, liberal
view injunctive relief has been granted in cases concerning such dis-
similar and unrelated products as jewelry and motion pictures,5 9
drugs and cigars, 60 pipes and shirts,6 ' food and radios,62 fountain pens
and razor blades,68 mineral oil and figs, 64 food and a cleaning and dye-
ing business,65 and locks and flashlights.66 Even more directly in
point with the subject case is Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 7
and Esquire,* Inc. v. Esquire Bar.68 In the Vogue case the publisher
of "Vogue," a ladies' fashion magazine, was held entitled to restrain
the use of its tradename as a label on defendant's hats. In the Esquire
case, the publisher of "Esquire," a gentlemen's fashion magazine, was
held entitled to injunctive relief from the use of its tradename as
the name for defendant's bar. In both cases the element of real com-
petition was lacking for obviously the publisher of "Vogue" could
not lose the sale of a hat to the defendant, nor could the publisher of
"Esquire" lose the sale of a highball. But, in both cases, a secondary
meaning having been established, the plaintiffs stood to lose an interest
equally as valuable, namely, the link, even though possibly anonymous,
between themselves and their consumers, which has been established
through their ingenuity and the merits of their wares or services. 9 As
has been indicated by an eminent writer in the field,70 since the func-
tion of a tradename is to bring to the public mind the article of the
maker, any conduct or use of the name which makes it less unique
lief under a theory which seems to include territory coextensive with the plain-
tiff's reputation regardless of whether the plaintiff engages in user in such
territory. Buckspan v. Hudson's Bay Co., 22 F. 2d 721 (C.C.A. 5th 1927);
Terminal Barber Shops v. Zoberg, 28 F. 2d 807 (C.C.A. 2d 1928); Vogue Co.
v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 Fed. 509 (C.C.A. 6th 1924) ; Wall v. Rolls-Royce
of America, 4 F. _d 333 (C.C.A. 3d 1925).
"
8Elgin National Watch Co. v. Ill. Watch Case Co., 179 U. S. 665 (1901);
Merriam v.'Saalfield, 198 Fed. 369 (C.C.A. 6th 1912). See Nims, op. cit. supra
note 36, at 389.
" Tiffany and Co. v. Tiffany Productions Inc., 147 Misc. 679, 264 N. Y. Supp.
459 (1932), aff'd 237 App. Div. 801 (1932), aff'd 262 N. Y. 482, 188 N. E. 30
(1933).
"' Peninsular Chemical Co. v. Levinson, 247 Fed. 658 (C.C.A. 6th 1917).
"'Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Dunhill Shirt Shop, 3 F. Supp. 487
(S.D.N.Y. 1929).
"
2Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. A. & P. Radio Stores, Inc., 20 F.
Supp. 703 (E. D. Pa. 1937).
'L. E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F. 2d 272 (C.C.A. 2d 1934).
" Standard Oil Co. v. California Peach and Fig Growers, 28 F. 2d 283 (Del.
1928).
"' Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. A. & P. Cleaners and Dyers, 10 F.
Supp. 450 (W. D. Pa. 1934).
" Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F. 2d 972 (C.C.A. 2d 1928).
67300 Fed. 509 (C.C.A. 6th 1924).
'37 F. Supp. 875 (S. D. Fla. 1941).
Ce Schechter, supra note 38 at 833.
"Old at 813.
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and distinctive lessens to that extent the likelihood of its suggesting
the article so named to the public conscience. As such a reduction in
distinctiveness is harmful whether the name be used on a related or
entirely different product, equity should prevent such use or else the
name will ultimately become entirely colorless. It is this gradual whit-
tling away of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the plain-
tiff's tradename, and the resultant dilution of its selling powers, by
constant use in connection with non-competing goods, that the court
is attempting to prohibit in the Vogue and Esquire cases. 71 The court's
objective was the same in the subject case where it was greatly aided by
the additional competitive situation created by the plaintiff's sales pro-
motion program for dresses which had been advertised in its magazine.
The result of a contrary rule would be a failure of the law to cope
with the constantly developing ingenuity of the trade parasite.7 2 Dur-
ing the days of the early development of the law of unfair competition
the methods of merchandising articles of commerce were such that
comparatively little, if any, damage would follow the appropriatidn of
a tradename, even in a primary sense, by a non-competitor. 73  Today,
when millions are spent annually in national advertising to create and
maintain far reaching reputation in a tradename, the courts are pre-
sented with an entirely different problem which taxes the adaptability
of the old rules, too often narrowly expressed. The problem can be
satisfactorily met only by keeping the principles of the law of unfair
competition elastic by tempering them with "good conscience" and
"judicial sensibilities" in their application.
JoHN RiCHARD JOPDAN, JR.
"'Note, 86 U. oF PA. L. REv. 444, 446 (1938).
""See Rogers, The Ingenuity of the Infringer and the Courts, 11 Mica. L.
Ray. 358 (1913).
'* Oates, supra note 54 at 644.
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